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Executive Summary 
In 2005, the system of currency regulation has been significantly overhauled in Ukraine. On 
the one hand, several restrictions were relaxed or abolished. On the other hand, new 
temporary measures were introduced in September in an attempt to deter “hot money” from 
entering the country. We support the use of unremunerated reserve requirements (URR) on 
short-term foreign currency loans from non-resident sources, since this instrument is well-
targeted, flexible and market-based. But we oppose the prohibition of local currency time 
deposits for non-residents, as it does not discriminate between maturities. Besides, this 
instrument has no flexibility and is not market-based. Consequently, we advice the National 
Bank of Ukraine (NBU) not to extend the use of this temporary prohibition beyond February 
2006. Instead, the NBU should focus on short-term deposits only and apply a URR on them. 
Furthermore, we recommend abolishing the Pension Fund contribution of 1.3% levied for 
purchases of foreign currency, because of its negative effect on the foreign exchange market. 
In a long-term view, we present our considerations regarding the sequencing of future 
relaxations of foreign exchange regulations. 
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1 Introduction 
The rise of cross-border capital flows associated with increased financial integration can bring 
substantial benefits, but recent international experience also underscores possible risks. 
Policymakers must therefore carefully manage such flows in order to find the appropriate 
balance between benefits and risks. 
Ukraine has been no exception in this context. While there has been a recent trend of 
abolishing existing regulations in order to reap the long-term benefits of foreign capital, other 
regulations have been recently introduced to target “hot money” inflows (i.e. portfolio and 
short-term debt inflows) of foreign capital. The latter is of obvious concern to policymakers, as 
it is of a speculative nature and therefore more prone to sudden shifts in investor sentiments. 
The purpose of this paper is accordingly twofold: to evaluate the usefulness of existing capital 
account regulations in Ukraine and to address the key issues of a longer-term strategy of 
capital account liberalization. 
After a short overview of the general economic context of benefits and risks of inflows of 
foreign capital (Part 2) we analyse instruments that are frequently used to control capital 
account transactions (Part 3). The following section (Part 4) assesses the usefulness of 
recently introduced regulations in Ukraine and derives concrete policy recommendations. Next, 
we take a long-term view and ask how the capital account liberalization should be sequenced 
in order to ensure that the benefits outweigh the risks (Part 5). Finally, some concluding 
remarks are presented (Part 6). 
2 Benefits and risks of foreign capital inflows 
From the perspective of an emerging market country, abolishing controls on capital account 
transactions leads in general to an increase in capital inflows, as non-resident investors are 
trying to actively participate in the domestic markets. The following economic long-term 
benefits are associated with these inflows of foreign capital: 
Financing of domestic investment 
Foreign capital can stimulate domestic investment when domestic savings are in limited 
supply, a situation that is typical for emerging markets. This increase in investment through 
reduced costs of capital supports more rapid economic growth. The most relevant category of 
foreign capital for the development process is foreign direct investment (FDI). There is a 
considerable amount of evidence that further economic benefits, including spillovers of new 
technologies and the transfer of efficient business practices are associated with FDI. 
Furthermore, it tends to be more long-term oriented and more stable than mobile or “hot 
money” flows. 
Development and strengthening of domestic financial markets 
Capital account liberalization can play a crucial role in the development of domestic financial 
markets. The increase and widening of the investor base through foreign capital is expected to 
lead to a gradual deepening and broadening and an improved resilience in domestic financial 
markets. Transaction costs for all market participants are expected to decrease due to the 
dissemination of financial innovation originating from other countries. Thus, financial markets, 
or the financial intermediation process in general, will become more efficient, transparent and 
diversified. Furthermore, a highly developed and competitive system of financial 
intermediation creates also positive externalities like an increase in domestic savings.   
Imposition of macroeconomic discipline 
It is frequently argued that increased financial integration has worked as a disciplining market 
force on domestic policymakers, and has helped to improve the quality of macroeconomic 
management. High capital inflows thus signal that a country is willing to follow prudent 
macroeconomic policies, whereas unsustainable polices leading to external and fiscal 
imbalances or debt accumulation can trigger sudden outflows.  
However, while many emerging markets have indeed benefited greatly from these external 
inflows, it is the reality that financial integration involves some well known trade-offs. Past 
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experience of numerous emerging markets has highlighted the fact that a couple of risks are 
associated with such a reform strategy of liberalization:  
Misallocation of foreign capital 
A major risk is that capital inflows are being intermediated in an inefficient way. Domestic 
financial markets have to be developed up to a point where they can allocate these inflows 
efficiently. In the presence of weak and inadequately supervised local financial institutions with 
limited capacity to assess, supervise, and manage risks such inflows could further lead to 
currency, maturity, and duration mismatches for both the banking and corporate sector.  
Loss of macroeconomic stability 
The rise in international capital flows has also certain macroeconomic risk implications. While 
capital inflows ease external financing constraints, they also pose significant dilemmas for the 
conduct of monetary policy. For instance, opening the capital account to inflows runs the risk 
of producing a sharp real appreciation and possible overshooting of the domestic currency. The 
usual policy response to such inflows under fixed exchange rates has been to conduct sterilized 
intervention. However, such intervention is generally of limited use since its effectiveness 
suffers within an open capital account context as substitutability of assets increases, and it has 
further financial implications for the central bank like quasi-fiscal costs (typically, higher-
yielding domestic bonds are exchanged for lower-yielding foreign bonds). 
Increase in volatility and “sudden stops” of capital flows 
While an open capital account can help a country to weather the effects of domestic shocks, it 
increases at the same time the local vulnerability and exposure to external shocks. The most 
serious problems can occur when internationally mobile capital suddenly decides to leave the 
country, often leading to a subsequent banking and currency crisis. Such episodes of “sudden 
stops” or reversals of highly volatile and speculative “hot money” flows to emerging economies 
have been frequently observed in the past in a number of countries. The risk for the recipient 
country is therefore that during the process of capital account liberalization it may become 
gradually more exposed to contagion effects and the herding behaviour of international 
investors. 
Conclusion 1: Foreign capital inflows can make a major contribution to economic 
development, but they also entail certain risks. Therefore, it is critical to conduct 
liberalization within a sound and sustainable economic policy framework to reap the 
benefits at a reasonable degree of risk. 
3 Instruments for regulating capital flows 
From a theoretical viewpoint, two main types of controls on international capital movements 
can be distinguished: controls on capital inflows and controls on capital outflows. However, in 
practice it is not always a straightforward task to determine whether a certain control impacts 
in- or outflows. Some controls on outflows (e.g. controls regulating the repatriation of foreign 
capital) can be established in order to discourage inflows, i.e. even though strictly a control on 
outflows, its intended purpose is to reduce inflows.   
Controls on capital inflows 
Proponents of controls on capital inflows share the view that massive inflows of foreign capital, 
mainly in the form of short-term portfolio flows and bank debt, behaved too erratic and 
unpredictable to be a major source of external finance for emerging markets. Consequently, 
countries should discourage excessive foreign exposures of domestic banks and corporations 
by adopting controls on short-term inflows. Chile, which is a widely-studied case on the 
effectiveness of capital inflow controls, had several goals in mind when it passed capital 
controls in 1991 (Annex 1 provides a brief assessment of Chile’s experience with capital 
controls). First, to slow down the absolute volume of capital flows and to change the 
composition of flows towards longer maturities. Second, to reduce real exchange rate 
appreciation resulting from inflows. Third, to allow the central bank to conduct an independent 
monetary policy aimed at domestic targets. Fourth, it was the stated objective of the 
authorities to reduce the country's vulnerability to international financial crises. 
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Regarding the actual implementation of controls on inflows, two types of regulations can be 
distinguished: market-based controls (consisting of mandatory unremunerated reserve 
requirements [URR] on inflows) and administrative controls (minimum stay requirements and 
direct quantitative controls on inflows). 
Market-based controls like URRs work in principle in the following way: non-residents wishing 
to move funds into the country are required to make non-interest bearing deposits at the 
central bank. By forcing investors to deposit, at zero interest, a proportion of their funds in the 
central bank, the system of URR is equivalent to a tax on capital inflows and increases the 
costs of external finance. The associated costs depend on the proportion of the investment 
that has to be deposited, on the length of time the reserve must be held at the bank, and on 
the opportunity cost of these funds. The URR can be handled in a flexible manner: if the 
reserve requirements are set to zero, the restrictions on short-term indebtedness are 
eliminated in practice but the mechanism remains available for future use. Some countries 
differentiate reserve requirements for banks further according to both the residency and 
currency of denomination of deposits, while others differentiate only according to currency of 
denomination but not residency. Furthermore, normally foreign investors can waive this 
instrument by paying an up-front fixed fee which is related to the implied opportunity costs of 
the URR. 
A far more restrictive class of controls on inflows are administrative measures. These 
measures can consist of minimum stay requirements (e.g. one year) on foreign capital inflows 
of several types (portfolio investment, bank flows, etc.). Again, the purpose of this measure is 
to effectively discourage short-term inflows. A more drastic measure is the imposition of direct 
quantitative controls on inflows, often in the form of outright prohibitions. These can take 
several forms, from restrictions concerning non-residents’ investments in domestic securities 
markets (money, bond, and equity markets) to restrictions placed on external borrowings of 
residents and non-residents’ access to local currency deposits in the domestic banking system.  
It is difficult to assess the general effectiveness of inflow controls in reaching their stated 
objectives due to the widely differing economic conditions, policy frameworks, and 
international environment in which they were implemented. Some observers subscribe to the 
view that temporary inflow controls of the type Chile has implemented can be considered as 
prudential measures - as regulations designed to ensure the stability of the financial sector. 
However, these controls also have costs. The most important one is that they will increase the 
cost of capital significantly, especially for small- and medium-sized (SME) firms which find it 
difficult to evade controls1. In effect, a segmentation of the credit market results. A country 
considering the adoption of such inflow controls must therefore trade-off this higher cost of 
capital, especially for SMEs, with potential benefits like a reduced macroeconomic vulnerability 
to short-term inflows of capital. 
Controls on capital outflows 
Controls on capital outflows have been frequently proposed and implemented as a tool in 
financial and currency crises. Such controls can take a number of forms, including taxes on 
funds to be remitted abroad, separate exchange rates for current and capital account 
transactions, and outright prohibition of transfers of funds abroad. According to the timing of 
their imposition, two types of outflow controls can be distinguished (see EDWARDS [1999]): 
preventive controls (when a country is facing a balance of payments deficit, but has not yet 
devalued) and curative controls (for countries already facing a major crisis). The idea behind 
the former measures is that they will discourage speculation by restricting non-residents 
access to domestic currency and help to slow down the decrease of international reserves, 
giving the authorities the necessary time required to implement effective adjustment 
programs. The latter type would give a crisis-country additional time to restructure its financial 
sector in an orderly and undisturbed fashion. Once the economy is back on track, controls 
should be dismantled. 
The empirical evidence – even though not fully conclusive- suggests that the implementation 
of outflow controls of various types has been largely ineffective. Such controls send negative 
                                   
1 As we will explain later on, firms frequently find ways to circumvent controls, thereby reducing the effectiveness of 
such measures.   
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signals to the market, and the private sector finds always ways of evading controls, rendering 
their purpose of slowing down capital flight as unsuccessful. At the same time, once controls 
are established, the authorities usually fail to restructure the domestic economies, or to 
implement credible economic reforms, justifying investors’ fears. In many cases, the presence 
of such permanent outflow controls therefore heightened the risk of a currency and banking 
crisis.  
Conclusion 2: While it can be useful to have market-based regulations on short-term 
inflows in the toolbox of economic policy instruments, their activation should be only 
temporary and strictly limited to times of crisis due to the costs associated with 
them. They should not be considered a substitute for sound economic and financial 
policies. Capital outflows should not be restricted. 
4 Assessment of recently introduced temporary regulations 
As became clear in the last section, there are sound economic arguments for regulating “hot 
money” inflows, as these flows follow a potentially volatile pattern and may endanger 
macroeconomic stability. If the overall aim of the Ukrainian authorities is the discouragement 
of such inflows2, combined with a compositional shift of inflows towards more long-term flows, 
the existing regulations need to be thoroughly evaluated against this background. The key 
issue is whether current regulations in place can achieve this goal in a systematic, efficient and 
non-distortionary way. Furthermore, a certain amount of built-in flexibility is needed to ensure 
that controls are being activated only in times when “hot money” inflows negatively influence 
macroeconomic management and stability. In times when such inflows are not an important 
issue, or the macroeconomic risks lie more on the outflow side, they should be relaxed or 
suspended. 
We therefore concentrate our evaluation on two recently introduced regulatory measures: the 
prohibition of local currency time deposits for non-residents (NBU [2005b] Letter from 29 
September 2005) and the obligatory reservation of funds for foreign currency transactions 
(NBU [2005a] Decree No. 291) . A further regulation, the Pension Fund duty levied on foreign 
currency purchases will be discussed subsequently. While it is a well-established feature of 
foreign exchange regulations in Ukraine, and therefore in a strict sense not new, its effect on 
capital inflows (including “hot money”) needs to be clarified.  
Prohibition of local currency time deposits for non-residents  
In Ukraine, non-residents are generally not allowed to keep traditional time deposits with 
banks in local currency. As a measure to restrict short-term flows, this outright prohibition is 
clearly ineffective, as it does not discriminate between the maturities of inflows. Furthermore, 
this regulation has to be evaluated very critically from another point of view, as it in effect 
prohibits banks from funding long-term domestic currency assets (e.g. loans) with 
corresponding long-term time deposits supplied by non-residents, thereby lowering the 
currency and maturity mismatches of their balance sheets. We suggest therefore its abolition, 
and the concentration on the below-discussed reserve requirement to deal with negative 
implications of “hot money”.  
Obligatory reservation of funds for foreign currency transactions 
This regulation is applied to residents’ short-term foreign currency credits and loans (up to 180 
days) from non-resident sources and amounts to 20% of the value of the transaction. It works 
in effect like a URR described previously, and as became clear in the last section, there is 
indeed a rationale for such measures to limit Ukraine’s exposure to short-term external 
liabilities. It is potentially a well-targeted, market-based instrument, whose application can be 
furthermore handled in a flexible manner.  
However, legal restrictions are frequently circumvented by the private sector. Some simple 
mechanisms make use of current account transactions to evade such restrictions on capital 
account transactions (by resort to leads and lags and over- and underinvoicing of exports and 
                                   
2 A practical problem may arise in the detection of the “hot money” component in short-term inflows which include 
also items like trade credits that should not fall under these regulations.  
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imports), or simply misstate the purpose of capital movements, or switch to other kinds of 
(not regulated) instruments that are close substitutes for regulated instruments. These 
developments erode the effectiveness of regulations over time, making it in turn necessary to 
extend the coverage of controls. Our suggestion is therefore, to consider the generalization of 
URR coverage to other (new) short-term debt inflows such as deposits. Regarding portfolio 
investments which can be potentially of a speculative nature, a further problem arises as these 
inflows do not have a fixed maturity from an ex-ante point of view. In this context, a possible 
solution would be to introduce a fixed duration of the URR (e.g. 3 or 6 month), irrespective of 
the actual maturity of the investment. This would allow a more broad-based and non-
discriminatory treatment of all kinds of “hot money” inflows with respect to the assumed goal 
of limiting their impact on the domestic economy. In addition, and along with international 
practice, it should be considered to give foreign investors the option to pay an equivalent up-
front fee3 instead of deposition the funds at the NBU. 
Regarding the concrete URR rate, it should be determined according to market conditions. 
Under current conditions, where risks related to short-term inflows are clearly not an issue, 
but rather relate to capital outflows, the reserve rate could be accordingly reduced (down to a 
minimum of 0%), to encourage foreign inflows that help to stabilize the foreign exchange 
market. In case that the risks shift over time (e.g. after a favourable outcome of the March 
2006 elections according to foreign investors’ opinions) more to the inflow side, it can be 
quickly increased to fulfil its described purpose. However, it has to be kept in mind that even a 
rate of 0% doesn’t mean that the instrument is abolished completely; it rather shows that the 
instrument is available for further use.  
Pension Fund duty on foreign currency purchases 
As of 1 January 2006, this duty on all interbank foreign currency purchases has been reduced 
to from 1.5% to 1.3%, as specified in the 2006 state budget. Since the implicit costs of this 
duty are inversely related to the maturity of the foreign investment, this provides a 
disincentive for short-term flows. 
However, due to its universal appliance, a thorough evaluation of this instrument needs to take 
into account its overall impact on the foreign exchange market. In this respect, there are three 
points to note. First, since it concerns all foreign investors whishing to move out funds, it is a 
general obstacle for foreign investments in Ukraine and thus has a negative impact. Second, 
since it covers all foreign exchange transactions, also proprietary trading conducted by banks, 
it effectively punishes banks that try to provide liquidity to the market. A liquid and therefore 
more efficient foreign exchange market serves important economic functions in several 
respects (e.g. with regard to exporters and importers, investors, underlying for hedging 
instruments, etc.), which means that any measure that suppresses liquidity provision should 
be avoided. Third, since this duty is universally allied to foreign currency purchase in the 
interbank market, it covers also current account transactions like currency purchases for 
imported goods. Here again, there are drawbacks with this measure, as it penalizes e.g. the 
import of much needed capital goods. All arguments taken together, they make a strong point 
for the abolishment of this pension duty on foreign currency purchases.4    
Conclusion 3: In order to discourage “hot money”, the NBU should concentrate on a 
URR on a broad basis. The prohibition of local currency time deposit for non-
residents and the Pension Fund duty on foreign currency purchases should be 
removed.  
5 Capital account liberalization: a long-term view 
The objective of a strategy of sequencing the necessary reform steps in opening up the capital 
account is to find an optimal adjustment path that maximizes Ukraine’s economic welfare, 
given its initial structural constraints, especially in the financial sector. There are two basic 
                                   
3 This fee, which is equivalent to the interest cost of the URR would be determined by the product of a relevant foreign 
interest rate (e.g. LIBOR) and the fraction of funds to be deposited at the NBU. 
4 The abolishment of the pension duty will decrease the revenues of the highly deficitary Pension Fund. Consequently, 
an alternative source of finance has to be found. But this problem should not be considered as a reason to maintain an 
extremely distortionary instrument, which obstructs investment and economic growth. 
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approaches to capital account liberalization: the first is the big-bang approach, in which the 
capital account is opened rapidly; the second is a gradual approach in which liberalization is 
undertaken slowly over a period of time. 
The big-bang (or shock) approach of immediately opening the capital account has been- with 
very mixed results- followed by a number of emerging markets in the early 1990s. Proponents 
of this strategy argued that a commonly observed lack of credibility of the reform process 
makes it necessary to act quickly, and is also needed to overcome resistance from different 
interest groups. 
Current thinking, however, favours a more gradual strategy of sequencing capital account 
liberalization. The conventional view of sequencing shares the same ultimate goal of an open 
capital account, but differs in its recommendations on how to sequence reform steps optimally. 
While it is commonly agreed in the policy-oriented sequencing literature that real sector 
liberalization (including the current account), macroeconomic stabilization (both fiscal and 
monetary), as well as financial sector reform should precede capital account liberalization, 
special consideration is paid to country-specific characteristics. The impact of an open capital 
account on the conduct of monetary and exchange rate policy (Box 1) is a fundamental issue 
in this respect. 
Box 1 
Capital account liberalization and monetary and exchange rate policy 
Theoretical considerations suggest that it is impossible for policymakers to simultaneously pursue a 
pegged exchange rate, an independent monetary policy and an open capital account (the “impossible 
trinity”). Once the decision to liberalise cross-border capital flows has been taken, the choice is to either 
fix the exchange rate or have an independent monetary policy, but not both at the same time. 
If the government decides to liberalize the capital account, and capital is therefore freely mobile, a 
credible fixed nominal exchange rate leads to a loss in monetary policy independence, as capital flows 
tend to drive domestic interest rates towards the level of foreign rates. In the context of a pegged 
regime, it is therefore required that monetary policy is subordinated to the maintenance of the nominal 
anchor and domestic interest rates can adjust freely in response to capital flows. On the other hand, an 
independent monetary leaves under the restriction of an open capital account the exchange rate to be 
determined by market forces. With an increased openness to capital flows, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy depends therefore critically on the degree to which a flexible exchange rate is maintained. 
The possibilities to assign monetary and exchange rate policy to achieve different macroeconomic targets 
at the same time become ultimately impossible with a liberalized capital account. An open capital account 
will therefore bring more sharply into focus any existing inconsistencies between monetary and exchange 
rate policies: if monetary policy is targeted at domestic inflation, the exchange rate cannot be targeted at 
the same time (e.g. to achieve certain current account objectives). This fundamental relationship is 
modified only in the case that countries maintain capital account restrictions, or domestic and foreign 
assets are not considered to be perfect substitutes. In both cases, central banks may retain some control 
over monetary policy even with a pegged exchange rate.  
The authorities require another instrument to offset large capital inflows, namely fiscal policy. A tight 
fiscal policy lowers domestic absorption, thereby reducing pressure on the exchange rate. Fiscal 
consolidation can therefore be one possible way to achieve domestic stabilization objectives. However, it 
has to be kept in mind that fiscal policy instruments exhibit a limited short-run flexibility due to lengthy 
formulation and implementation issues, which constrain their usefulness in dealing with short-term 
capital inflows.  
The key point to recognize in the sequencing of capital account liberalization is the danger of 
removing existing restrictions on cross-border transactions before major problems in the 
domestic financial system have been tackled. Countries in which such problems are severe 
should not take the risk of incurring a serious financial crisis by too rapidly opening their 
capital account. A gradual and integrated approach that allows for the building-up of a certain 
threshold of domestic financial markets, institutions, and instruments could help to allocate 
external capital more efficiently. 
Regarding Ukraine, the process of the liberalization of the capital account and the development 
of Ukraine’s financial system must be combined in order to reduce the risk involved. 
Prerequisites for moving towards an open capital account consist of strengthening the 
domestic financial system by improving the regulatory and supervisory framework and 
prudential controls, especially when substantial inflows are intermediated through the banking 
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system. In more detail, this would concern areas like risk-management practices, bankruptcy 
and insolvency laws, adequate capital requirements and transparent auditing and accounting 
systems. 
Other policy implications can be derived from the sequencing debate with respect to the order 
of liberalization of the individual components of the capital account. Capital inflows should be 
permitted on as broad a front as current conditions allow, beginning with long-term flows 
before short-term flows and low-risk foreign direct investment flows ahead of more risky 
portfolio and bank-debt flows. While foreign direct investment might help to smooth real sector 
reforms like industry restructuring and export orientation, portfolio and debt flows play an 
important role for further banking and securities market liberalization and development. 
The extent to which capital account liberalization is conducted asymmetrically-more open to 
inflows than outflows or vice versa, can be exploited temporary and within certain limits by 
domestic authorities. If it is necessary to dampen the negative effects of short-term portfolio 
or debt inflows, an asymmetric relaxation of existing controls on outflows can take some 
pressure from the exchange rate. However, a substantial degree of asymmetry in the 
openness of the capital account can lead to serious misalignments in the exchange rate as 
compared to its long-term equilibrium. Thus, in the process of capital account liberalization 
existing asymmetries should be gradually removed to facilitate an orderly correction of any 
potential misalignments.  
Conclusion 4: The liberalization of the capital account should be sequenced in a 
gradual manner that closely complements financial sector reform in Ukraine. 
Financial stability requires the development of a well-regulated and supervised 
financial sector. Furthermore, due to its linkages, capital account liberalization needs 
to be coordinated with appropriate monetary, exchange rate, as well as fiscal 
policies.  
6 Conclusions 
As has been demonstrated above, international capital flows bring many benefits, but they also 
entail certain risks. It is therefore the task of the authorities to develop a toolbox of foreign 
exchange regulations that ensure an optimal balance of benefits and risks. In this paper, we 
identified the risks mainly associated with short-term speculative inflows of foreign capital, so-
called “hot money”. Consequently, the NBU needs market-based and flexible instruments that 
target these inflows. The URR currently in place is such an instrument that we consider an 
adequate reply to such inflows if applied on a broad basis, and its temporary use is subject to 
market conditions. Other instruments, like the Pension Fund duty on foreign currency 
purchases and the prohibition of local currency time deposits for non-residents are regulations 
that are either not market-based, lack flexibility, or do not target specifically “hot money” 
flows and should therefore be removed.  
Following a long-term view, there is indeed a strong rationale for Ukraine to open up its capital 
account, moving towards the ultimate objective of full liberalization. Almost all developed 
economies have open capital accounts, a fact that suggests that capital account liberalization 
is an inevitable and unavoidable step on the path of economic development. At the same time, 
it is an integral part of conventional wisdom that capital account liberalization has important 
prerequisites and should be viewed as an important component in a broad scheme of reforms. 
Liberalization of the capital account can be counterproductive, if it takes place before severe 
domestic distortions have been removed and before domestic financial markets, institutions, 
and the capacities of the prudential authorities have developed and foreign funds can be 
subsequently channelled in productive activities. In order to deal with these risks, a solid 
macroeconomic framework and a healthy financial system with an effective system of 
prudential regulation and supervision are required.  
 
Kyiv/Berlin, February 2006 
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Annex 1 
Country experience with temporary controls on capital inflows: the case of Chile 1991-
1998 
When 1991 a surge in capital inflows intruded with macroeconomic policy and put the domestic 
currency under real appreciation pressure, Chile implemented capital inflow regulations, with 
an unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) being the most relevant instrument (other, less 
important regulations included a minimum withholding period applied to foreign direct 
investment, and limitations to issue securities in foreign markets). The URR consisted of a 
compulsory and non-remunerated deposit in foreign exchange that had to be kept at the 
central bank, which was designed to discourage short-term borrowing without affecting long-
term foreign investments. 
Several measures had to be taken over time to close loopholes and improve the effectiveness 
of the URR. When it was introduced, it amounted to 20%, and the term of the URR deposit was 
equal to the maturity of the foreign funds. Soon, it was raised to 30% (and the term of the 
URR deposit was unified to one year irrespective of the maturity of the funds) and kept at that 
level until 1998 when it was first reduced to 10% and then to zero, after the sharp reduction in 
capital inflows to emerging markets in the aftermath of the Asian crisis (the instrument was 
formally removed in 2001). In the process of generalization of URR coverage, it was extended 
to cover most forms of foreign financing except foreign direct investment. In reality, this 
meant that loans, fixed-income securities, and most equity investments were subject to the 
URR, and only FDI and American Depositary Receipt (ADR5) primary issuance were exempted 
from it. The URR coverage6 of gross capital inflows in that period fluctuated between a 
minimum of 30% (1994) and a maximum of 60% (1992). 
Although coverage of the URR was extended over time, circumvention reduced its 
effectiveness. Examples of such legal avoidance strategies by economic agents included ADR 
and bond issuance abroad, the use of suppliers’ credit and direct trade financing. In addition to 
the legal circumvention, the avoidance of the URR could have also taken the form of illegal 
evasion by way of capital flight. 
Despite these limitations, the URR has been widely acclaimed as effective in fulfilling its goals. 
This refers not so much to a containment of the size of capital inflows (which was not 
intended) but rather to an improvement in the composition of external financing towards more 
long-term flows. The instrument reduced the share of portfolio and other short-term capital 
flows in total inflows, while increasing the respective share of foreign direct investment and 
other long-term flows, leaving the overall volume of capital inflows roughly unchanged. 
Furthermore, it gave additional room of manoeuvre for monetary policy and signalled the 
authorities’ commitment to ensure financial stability. 
Sources: EDWARDS [1999], LE FORT [2005], BIS [2005].  
                                   
5 ADR’s are certificates issued by a US bank representing a specific number of foreign shares that trade on a US stock 
exchange. ADR’s allow US investors to easily invest in foreign stocks without having to buy the stocks on a non-US 
exchange. 
6 The URR coverage sets the amount of gross inflows to which the URR is applied into relation to total gross inflows. 
